Li Ka-shing's port was taken away by a "constitutional" ruling. What does this geopolitical confrontation reveal?

On February 1, 2026, an apparently ordinary judicial date rewrote a corner of the global business landscape. The Long Group’s two strategic ports in Panama were completely reclaimed by the Supreme Court’s ruling of “unconstitutionality.” This company, which had operated for 28 years and transformed a dilapidated dock into a Latin American hub, quietly exited. Following closely, Danish shipping giant Maersk announced its takeover. Li Ka-shing lost the ports, but the true significance of this event goes far beyond a commercial dispute — it is the final strategic purge by the United States in its “backyard,” and a precise geopolitical confrontation using legal tools as weapons.

Behind the Port Change of Hands Is an Upgrade in U.S. Strategic Thinking

It appears to be Panama reclaiming sovereignty, but in reality, it is the U.S. executing a global military logistics strategic deployment. The Panama Canal is one of the most important strategic passages worldwide; whoever controls the ports at both ends holds the “throat” between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. Naturally, the U.S. would not tolerate such a critical node falling into the hands of non-allies.

Li Ka-shing’s Long Group, though a private enterprise and known for its moderate, even “pro-Western” stance, has an unchangeable identity: Chinese capital background. In the U.S.’s new round of geopolitical strategy, this identity itself is a risk. No matter how efficient the operations or how much capital is invested, as soon as strategic key locations and nationality issues are involved, business performance becomes secondary.

Why Maersk’s “U.S. Military Identity” Is the Most Critical Piece

Why was Maersk specifically chosen to take over? The answer reveals the true nature of the event. Maersk Line, Limited, the U.S. subsidiary of Maersk Shipping, is not just a commercial operator; it is also one of the highest-level shipping contractors for the U.S. Department of Defense. This Danish company’s U.S. branch has deeply participated in the U.S. military’s VISA (Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement) and MSP (Maritime Security Program).

Historically, during the Gulf War and Iraq War, Maersk’s fleet carried out a large portion of U.S. military equipment transportation. In other words, Maersk is not only a commercial shipowner but also an “outsourced logistics department” for the U.S. military. When Panama handed over the ports to Maersk, it essentially brought the strategic key hubs at both ends of the canal directly under the control of the U.S. Military Sealift Command (MSC).

In future potential conflicts in the Pacific or scenarios involving Taiwan Strait, the U.S. Navy needs to pass through the Panama Canal at the fastest speed. They need control over crane operations, data center management, and the entire channel’s scheduling authority. This is no longer a matter of business succession but a formal handover of wartime command.

How “Retroactive Unconstitutionality” Became a Legal Tool to Remove Chinese Capital

What is most shocking is not the event itself but the legal method used by Panama’s Supreme Court: retroactive unconstitutionality.

Long Group’s canal port contracts began in 1997 and were renewed in 2021. These agreements were legally approved by the Panamanian government at the time. But now, the court suddenly declared “the procedures back then were not transparent, therefore unconstitutional.” This effectively opens a backdoor in the legal system: as long as political needs arise, judges can go back in time to invalidate decades-old legal agreements without any compensation — because once declared “unconstitutional,” the contracts are null from the start.

This is an upgraded version of U.S. “long-arm jurisdiction” and a redefinition of global business rules. It sends a cold message to Chinese enterprises worldwide: any written contract signed in Latin America, even if operated legally for 30 years and invested with $1.8 billion in upgrades, can be declared invalid at Washington’s command. More terrifyingly, because it is a “judicial ruling” rather than “confiscation,” you cannot obtain any compensation.

This approach is a direct blow to the spirit of commercial contracts; its real purpose is to create a chilling effect — forcing all Chinese enterprises to proactively withdraw from strategic nodes in Latin America.

Li Ka-shing’s Exit Signifies the End of an Era

Li Ka-shing represents a particular business era. As one of Asia’s most internationally minded entrepreneurs, he has always believed that mutual benefit can be achieved through business cooperation, technology transfer, and capital investment. His investment in the Panama ports exemplified this philosophy — not only operating the ports but also injecting $1.8 billion into modernization.

But Li Ka-shing’s forced exit marks the true end of an era. If even Li Ka-shing’s assets cannot be protected, and if a “pro-Western” stance cannot buy business protection, it indicates that the U.S. has entered a comprehensive phase of strategic cleansing against China — this is no longer a matter of specific enterprises but a systemic exclusion of all Chinese capital.

For China, this is a final warning. We once believed that by binding ourselves to local governments through business, and through technological and capital support, we could establish long-term, unshakeable cooperation. But reality proves that in the face of America’s absolute security concerns, these efforts are insignificant. The U.S., even at the expense of its own allies’ commercial reputation (like Panama), will remove China’s “nails” from strategic locations.

How China Can Break Through This Strategic Dilemma

Li Ka-shing’s departure demands a fundamental shift in China’s strategy in Latin America. Moving from “point breakthroughs” to “systematic defense,” from “dependence on a single route” to “multiple independent channels.”

Relying solely on the Panama Canal is fragile. We must accelerate the development of the “New Land-Sea Corridor” strategy, actively promote projects like the Quingdao Port in Peru and the transoceanic railway. Establish an independent logistics system that does not rely on the Panama Canal or U.S. influence. This is not about abandoning existing cooperation but shifting from passive response to proactive defense.

The echoes of the Panama Canal remain, but the rules have changed. From now on, this market will no longer follow “globalized business logic” but will adhere to “camp logic.” Li Ka-shing’s forced withdrawal has made this clear to us.